Grasping the small: The political economy of growth, poverty and the role of the state in two Chinese provinces by DONALDSON, John A.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
6-2008
Grasping the small: The political economy of
growth, poverty and the role of the state in two
Chinese provinces
John A. DONALDSON
Singapore Management University, jdonaldson@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the Political
Economy Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
DONALDSON, John A..(2008). Grasping the small: The political economy of growth, poverty and the role of the state in two Chinese
provinces. Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference 2008, June 4-6, Vancouver, BC.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/628
 Grasping the Small: The Political Economy of 
Growth, Poverty and the Role of the State in Two Chinese Provinces 
 
John A. Donaldson  
Department of Political Science 
Singapore Management University 
 
Prepared for delivery at the 2008 Annual Conference of the  
Canadian Political Science Association, June 4 – June 6, 2008 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver 
 
 “To the people, food is heaven.” – Mencius1   
Section One: Introduction 
Is growth good for the poor? In theory, yes. As one influential report on China’s “War on 
Poverty” argued (with an important caveat), ”Obviously robust economic growth helps reduce 
poverty, as long as the gains are reasonably distributed” (Rozelle, Zhang, and Huang 2000). In 
practice as well, growth is often a crucial ingredient in the poverty reduction recipe. While this 
relationship is well founded, important exceptions abound – some areas grow, but poverty 
persists; the economies of other areas stagnates, yet poverty diminishes. These exceptions, if 
studied, will not only illuminate further the causal relationship between these two concepts, but 
also provide hope for areas for which few prospects of growth exist. This paper examines two 
neighboring poor Chinese provinces, which faced similar challenges and shared similar 
characteristics. One grew sluggishly, but the rural poor experienced striking improvement; the 
other grew rapidly, but its poor people saw few gains, a pattern that can be seen between at 
least 1991 to the present. 
                                                     
1 A significantly different earlier version of this paper was also presented in May 2006 for the 
Asian Network for the Study of Local China (ANSLoC). I thank participants of that workshop 
for comments and suggestions. The author also gratefully acknowledges the generous research 
support of the Office of Research, Singapore Management University. 
 The first is Guizhou, a notoriously poor province 
in a remote southwest corner of China (Map 1).2 As 
shown in Table 1, Guizhou in 1991 performed poorly 
as measured both by its GNP/capita (RMB 890,3 last 
among the 30 provinces considered4) and by 
percentage of the population living below the 
international poverty line (59 percent, ranking 28 of 
30). Moreover, between 1991 and 1996, its economy 
grew sluggishly, ranking 29th for growth between 1991 and 1996.5 In spite of this poor 
economic performance both overall and in relation to its neighbor, Yunnan, however, between 
1991 and 1996, Guizhou province, according to World Bank statistics, stood among the leaders 
(3rd of 30) in poverty reduction, its poverty rate dropping 31 percentage points, from 59 percent 
to 28 percent. 
Province Per capita GDP 
(1991) Rank 
Poverty rate (1991) 
Rank 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth rate 
(1991-1996) Rank 
Poverty change 
(1991-1996) Rank 
Guizhou 30 28 29 3 
Yunnan 25 23 13 29 
Table 1: Economic rankings for Guizhou and Yunnan (rankings among 30 provinces). Source: 
Author’s calculations 
                                                     
2 For purposes of this paper, references to “China” refer to “Mainland China,” and exclude data 
related to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.  
3 The exchange rate has until recently been pegged at approximately RMB 8.2/US dollar. The 
population and area statistics for Guizhou and Yunnan come from Statistical Yearbooks.  
4 These statistics also exclude Chongqing. 
5 This information is based on the most reliable source for disaggregated poverty information in 
China currently available, a World Bank (2001) report, “China: Overcoming Poverty.” This 
report provides complete, relatively reliable poverty-level data for only two years, 1991 and 
1996. The other two years reported in the study (1989 and 1990) are not reliable, according to 
one of the study’s authors (Chen 2002).  
Map 1: China (Guizhou and Yunnan highlighted)1
 By contrast, Guizhou’s neighbor, Yunnan experienced rapid economic growth but little 
decline in poverty rates. Also a poor province, ranking in 1991 25th of 30 in per capita GDP and 
23rd in the proportion of the population below the international poverty line (44 percent), 
Yunnan’s nominal GDP nearly tripled from RMB 51.7 billion in 1991 to RMB 149 billion in 1996 
(its growth rate ranking 13th overall – remarkable for a western province in China). In spite of 
this, the province ranked 29th in overall poverty change between 1991 and 1996. Expressed in 
human terms and calculated based on China’s poverty line, the ranks of Guizhou’s poor 
declined from 6.2 million in 1991 to 3.8 million in 1996, a difference of 2.4 million people. By 
contrast, poverty in Yunnan claimed an additional 2.2 million people over the same period, 
with the number of poor rising from 5.5 million in 1991 to 7.7 million in 1996 (World Bank 
2001).  
 While the data from the World Bank measure these trends only to 1996,6 Figure 1, which 
compares the net rural income of poor and non-poor counties in the provinces, suggests this 
pattern continued past 1996, to at least 2002. Using data on per capita rural net income as a 
proxy for poverty, and calculating that measure separately for poor and non-poor counties of 
both provinces, as categorized by China’s central government, we can compare income levels of 
Guizhou and Yunnan’s poor and non-poor counties.7 Poor counties within Guizhou and 
Yunnan in 1992 had similar per capita net rural incomes (RMB 466 versus RMB 464). However, 
despite an economic growth rate that drastically outpaced Guizhou’s, nominal net rural 
                                                     
6 In May of 2005, a World Bank economist provided for me her dataset of Guizhou and 
Yunnan’s headcount poverty data to 2002, on the condition that I not publish them. They are 
consistent with the patterns seen in the net income data.  
7 China’s State Council, part of the central government, starting in 1986 designated hundreds of 
China’s counties as ‘poor.’ I adopt their classifications for this research. 
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Figure 1: Per capita net incomes – non-poor v. poor counties (Guizhou and 
Yunnan). Source: Guizhou and Yunnan Statistical Yearbooks, various years. 
 incomes in Yunnan’s poor counties increased on average three percentage points slower each 
year to 2002, compared to Guizhou’s poor counties. Meanwhile, increases in incomes of 
Yunnan’s non-poor counties outpaced that of Guizhou’s over that period. For both these two 
sources of data, the pattern is similar, suggesting that: a) poverty continued to fall in Guizhou at 
a faster rate than in Yunnan, despite Yunnan’s superior rate of economic growth, and b) 
Yunnan’s non-poor counties received most of the benefits from economic growth in the 
province. This pattern appears to be valid from 1991 to at least 2002. 
Section Two: Researching the Puzzle 
What explains this unexpected pattern? By asking this question, the present paper aspires 
to contribute to a broader debate concerning what explains the disconnect between two 
concepts—development and poverty. Specifically, I look at one form of ‘development,’ as 
evidenced by measures such as economic growth, industrialization and increased technology, 
and ‘poverty reduction,’ as indicated by declining numbers of poor people. Most scholars 
expect that economic growth is inversely related to poverty rates, an argument that most starkly 
presented in a paper entitled (Growth is Good for the Poor) penned by a pair of World Bank 
economists, David Dollar and Aart Kraay. Analyzing worldwide and historical data, they 
conclude, “It should come as no surprise that the general relationship between growth of 
income of the poor and growth of mean income is one-to-one,” (2000, 28).8 This contention 
contrasts with the more common belief that economic growth is often necessary, but 
                                                     
8 Finding a close correlation between growth and poverty reduction, the authors, by contrast, 
suggest there is little role for the government other than opening the economy, introducing rule 
of law, keeping inflation in check, and spending less. This paper sparked controversy 
throughout the academic and policy communities, with some supporting it (e.g., Bigsten and 
Levin 2001), and others criticizing it (e.g., Weisbrot et al. 2000; Rodrik 2000; Oxfam 2000). 
 insufficient, for poverty reduction; intervention, often by the state, is needed to ensure that the 
poor benefit from growth.  
In this project, I participate in the debate on whether growth actually ‘is good for the poor,’ 
not by directly refuting or supporting this argument, but by examining two unexpected cases: 
one Chinese province in which poverty declined despite China’s slowest economic growth, and 
another in which robust economic growth failed to reduce poverty.9 I explore the kinds of 
development and the types of activities that support poor rural people in improving their lives 
by adopting qualitative methodology of structured, focused comparative case study of the type 
called for by political scientists (e.g., George and Bennett 2005) and China scholars (e.g., Chung 
1995). Comparing cases of unexpected poverty change permits examinations of theories on how 
best to reduce poverty, involving the use of government and private actors, as well as engaging 
a public policy debate on the effectiveness of alternative strategies. It is my hope that these 
insights will not be irrelevant to the issues faced by other poor countries and economies. 
For this study, I adopted five different methods to collect data, including: 1) studying 
analytical and scholarly articles from Western and Chinese sources; 2) interviewing relevant 
officials and scholars in Beijing and both provincial capitals; 3) conducting fieldwork in both 
provinces, allowing direct observation of candidate explanations for the puzzle; 4) conducting 
semi-structured interviews with villagers and officials in dozens of counties and villages in the 
two target provinces; and 5) analyzing statistical data collected by a variety of organizations. 
My fieldwork was conducted in the 10 months between September 2003 and July 2004, and a 
follow up trip in Summer 2005). While each of these methods has biases, through using five I 
hope to “triangulate” evidence generated from each and not overly rely on any one data source.  
                                                     
9 The two cases were chosen because they were data points furthest away from a regression line 
generated by modeling the effect of growth on poverty in China’s provinces 
 Numerous factors can explain the increase in growth in Yunnan without a corresponding 
decrease in poverty and/or (preferably ‘and’) factors that explain the decrease in poverty in 
Guizhou without a corresponding increase in growth. My research involved exploring each of 
these factors – geographic, natural, demographic, cultural, economic and political – that can be 
used to explain this puzzle (Table 2). Candidate factors should explain these curious patterns 
and, in combination, affect millions of rural residents. While some studies examine the 
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction in the aggregate, this study 
reminds us that the specific distribution and structure of economic growth, and the policies 
used to generate it, cannot be ignored. Thus for each factor, I focus not just on volume (for 
instance, how much ‘road’ there is), but also distribution (is the road located in poor areas or in 
rich?) and structure (is the road accessible to poor people, or primarily to wealthy people?).  
  
Geographic/ 
Natural Factors 
Demographic 
Factors 
Cultural Factors Government/ 
Policy Factors 
- Mountainous 
terrain 
- Natural resource 
endowments 
- Arable land per 
capita 
- Natural disasters 
(flooding/ 
drought) 
- Weather (rain/ 
temperature) 
- Population/ 
population 
growth 
- Migration 
- Motivation 
- Minority 
Ethnicities 
- Civil Society 
 
 
- Central policy 
- International 
organization 
support 
- Corruption 
- Overall spending 
- Education/health 
- Central 
government 
transfers 
- Transportation/ 
infrastructure 
- Local taxation 
Industrial 
Structure 
Agricultural 
Production 
Industrial 
Production 
Services/Other 
Econ Factors 
- Industrial 
structure (GDP) 
- Industrial 
structure (Labor) 
- Overall 
agricultural 
production 
- Grain, meat, 
tobacco and other 
agricultural 
product 
production 
- Farm implements 
- Fertilizer use 
 
 
- Town-village 
Enterprises 
- Non-agricultural 
industrial 
production (steel, 
chemicals, 
textiles, etc.) 
- Power generation 
- Agricultural 
added-value 
industries 
- Coal/other 
mining materials 
- Inflation 
- Foreign trade 
- Foreign capital 
usage 
- Tourism 
 
Table 2: Candidate factors 
Space allows for exemplifying only a couple 
of rejected factors. For instance, government 
spending is a commonly cited factor affecting 
poverty and growth. However, Guizhou, both as 
a whole, and its poor counties, spent far less than 
Yunnan. Between 1991 and 1996, Yunnan spent 
between 45 to 58 percent more per capita than 
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Figure 2: Government expenditure/GDP. 
Source: China Financial Yearbook, Various 
Years.  
 Guizhou. Yunnan’s government spending 
relative to its GDP was among China’s highest, 
and in most years after 1991 Yunnan led all of 
China’s provinces (Figure 2). Guizhou, for its 
part, although spending more relative to its 
GDP than the average province, spends far less 
than Yunnan. Moreover, in terms of spending 
related to poverty reduction, Yunnan spent far 
more per capita compared to Guizhou, 
including on budgetary items such as support 
for poor areas and agricultural spending. 
Moreover, while both provinces have 
proportionally the same number of poor 
counties, the central government transferred 
more money to Yunnan to support poverty 
alleviation projects than it did Guizhou. This 
pattern continues up to at least 2002. 
Primary education, also cited as a critical factor for poverty reduction, likewise does not 
seem to explain this pattern of poverty reduction and economic growth in the two provinces. 
While Guizhou provides education in rural, and especially poor, areas, there is little evidence 
that it does so to a greater extent than other provinces. For instance, Guizhou’s spending on 
education has been a fraction of Yunnan’s (Figure 3), while primary school enrollment rates in 
the two provinces were similar in 1991 and 1996, both in poor and non-poor counties (Figure 4). 
The UNDP Human Development Report (1999) rated the education system of China’s provinces 
Education Budget/Capita
0
50
100
150
200
250
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
RM
B/
Ca
pi
ta
Yunnan Guizhou
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Figure 4: Primary school enrollment rates. Source: 
Guizhou Statistical Yearbook 1992, 1997; Yunnan 
Statistical Yearbook 1992, 1997)  
 using a measure of adult literacy rate and combined school enrollment rates; both Guizhou and 
Yunnan received the same score of 0.64, relatively low compared to other provinces.10 This is 
not to deny the nearly undeniable importance of education for poverty reduction, both in 
general and in Guizhou. Yet, because education does not vary within Yunnan and Guizhou, it 
apparently cannot explain the pattern of poverty reduction without economic growth. Similarly, 
other factors, including population growth, agricultural production, civil society, can be rejected 
as not part of this puzzle’s explanation. 
 
Section Three: Analysis of Key Factors 
How did the two provinces generate these different results? Four factors appear to be 
especially critical: roadways, tourism migration and coal mining. Evidence related to volume, 
distribution and structure of these factors increases our confidence that they explain this puzzle. 
Tourism, extensively discussed in a forthcoming China Quarterly article (Donaldson 
Forthcoming), was omitted for lack of space. I discuss the three other factors in this section. 
 
Factor 1: Roadway – “If you want to become wealthy, first build a road,” (Chinese saying) 
Roads are indeed often cited as crucial for both economic growth and poverty reduction – 
but how can they explain growth without poverty reduction (and vice versa)? Road types are 
numerous, with myriad functions and contrasting effects on growth and poverty. For instance, 
                                                     
10 Fieldwork revealed some aspects of Guizhou’s education system may be better than Yunnan’s  
I saw numerous examples of newly constructed schools, many funded by the four wealthy 
costal cities that have partnered with Guizhou to help reduce poverty. However, these 
examples provide little evidence that the quality of rural education is significantly better in 
Guizhou or in Yunnan, especially in the 1990s. However, research on the Indian state of Kerala 
consistently emphasizes the importance of the volumes of funds spent on education, which in 
our situation does not apply. More research is needed on this question. 
 highways can transport imports and exports, facilitate linkages for investment and aid, convey 
people reliably and conveniently to and from neighboring provinces, and more comfortably 
ferry visitors between popular tourist areas. Highways thus potentially contribute a great deal 
toward promoting economic growth (Jalilian and Weiss 2004; Estache 2004). However, unless a 
poor person lives adjacent to highways or convenient feeder roads, he or she will not benefit 
directly from highway construction. Highways by themselves are rarely sufficient to reduce 
poverty among dispersed, often isolated rural populations, and they are too costly to serve large 
numbers of far-flung farmers. 
By contrast, a country road linking poor villages to nearby market towns can make a 
significant difference in the lives and livelihoods of poor rural residents for a fraction of the cost 
of a highway (Fan and Chan-Kang 2004). Country roads vary a great deal in quality and width – 
from concrete roads to dirt roads. Towns in China have long been the locus of markets (Skinner 
1964), and their importance to the economy and their role in linking towns to villages is central. 
For the rural poor, a modest paved road, or even a dirt road that leads to a market town or 
county center, makes a greater difference by increasing access to markets and information. 
Country roads can also reduce the price of agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilizers and tools 
and increase farm productivity. Reducing time to markets also enhances incentives to produce 
marketable products, and over time can increase confidence in the value of investing in or 
borrowing money for expensive productive assets such as fruit trees. Navigable roads also 
augment the range of middlemen to drive into rural areas to purchase surplus agriculture 
directly from the farmers and sell it in further flung markets. Most research, however, does not 
separate roads by type, which might explain the mixed results in studies of roads and poverty 
reduction.  
 At the start of the 1990s, both Yunnan and Guizhou embarked on strikingly different 
transportation improvement schemes. Overall, although Guizhou also planned a modest 
highway system, the province constructed many more rural roads of the type that the literature 
suggests reduce poverty. Yunnan by contrast focused primarily on implementing an ambitious 
and successful plan to construct six cross-province high-quality highways. These varying 
political decisions affected the volume, distribution and most importantly, structure of each 
province’s road system, which in turn affected poverty reduction and economic growth in 
contrasting ways.  
Focusing on volume, while Yunnan had more road length than Guizhou for much of the 
1990s, Guizhou had a higher road density (road length per area) (Figure 5). In 1991, Guizhou’s 
overall road density of 17.9 km/100 km2 exceeded Yunnan’s 14.75 km/100 km2. By 1996, when 
Yunnan’s total roadway length of 70279 kilometers was the third longest of any province in 
China, compared to Guizhou’s rank of 20, Guizhou’s total density of roadway still exceeded 
Yunnan’s (18.58 km/100 km2 to 17.83731). Moreover, although Yunnan province constructed 
new roadway at a brisker pace 
compared to Guizhou, Yunnan’s 
road density did not catch up 
with Guizhou’s until after 1998.  
More importantly, Yunnan 
and Guizhou’s roads were of 
different types. Starting in 1992, 
Yunnan announced plans for its 
highway system – an ambitious Figure 5: Road density in Yunnan and Guizhou. 
Source: Yunnan and Guizhou Statistical Yearbooks, 
Various Years 
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 plan that focused on a set of six highways radiating out from the central axis of Kunming, the 
province’s capital. Three of these linked Kunming with three major border crossings, while 
three further roads linked Kunming with three provincial capitals. The six spurs, consisting 
primarily of class 1 and 2 highways together would total 3,458 kilometers.11 Guizhou province 
that same year announced a less ambitious plan for three main roadways, one east-west 
highway linking Hunan with Yunnan, and two north-south roads, one linking Guiyang with 
Guangxi and Chongqing – with the total highway density much lower than in Yunnan (see 
Table 3). Moreover, the volume of funds used to finance roadway investments contrasted 
between the two provinces. Even with its more modest ambitions, for this entire plan Guizhou 
needed an estimated RMB 12 billion, but could provide only a fraction of that (Gong 1996).  
Yunnan 1992 Highway Plans 3458 kilometers total 
Kunming → Myanmar border 925 kilometers 
Kunming →  Guizhou border 221 kilometers 
Kunming →  Sichuan border 471 kilometers 
Kunming → Guangxi border 480 kilometers 
Kunming →  Laos border 864 kilometers 
Kunming →  Vietnamese border 497 kilometers 
Guizhou 1992 Highway Plans 1378 kilometers total 
Hunan border ↔ Yunnan border 735 kilometers 
Guiyang → Guangxi border 321 kilometers 
Guiyang →  Chongqing border 322 kilometers 
Table 3: Highway plans of Yunnan and Guizhou (1992). Source: Authors 
calculations; Guizhou and Yunnan Yearbooks, Various Years 
Whereas Yunnan spent nearly RMB 1 billion in 1992, Guizhou’s spending did not reach that 
level until 1996.12 In part for this reason, Guizhou’s eastern spur, 14 years after its planning, has 
not yet been completed as recently as the spring of 2004. Not only did Guizhou focus its limited 
                                                     
11 Fan and Chan-Kang (2004) define high quality roads as expressways, and Class 1 and 2 roads 
and low quality roads as Class 3 and below.  
12 In 1991, Guizhou’s announced fixed capital investments in roadways was RMB 79.1 million, 
which climbed to RMB 1.1 billion in 1996. Yunnan, in contrast, spent RMB 971 million in 1992, 
RMB 1.75 billion in 1993 and RMB 1.56 billion in 1994 on roadways alone. Overall for the eighth 
five-year plan (1991-1995), Yunnan spent over RMB 7 billion on roadway construction.  
 transportation funding on areas where it could benefit poor people, but what highways it did 
construct were better distributed, compared to Yunnan’s, by linking poor areas with primary 
cities. On the other hand, Yunnan’s highways promoted trade flows with each of its neighbors 
and helped to increase tobacco production and tourism. These effects stimulated economic 
growth, but, due to the distribution and structure of the province’s new roadways, did not help 
as much to reduce poverty.  
In contrast with Yunnan’s highway plan, Guizhou focused primarily on constructing rural 
roadway, a plan that explicitly aimed to reduce rural poverty promulgated in March 1986 under 
the leadership of current Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao, who then served as the Secretary 
of Guizhou’s Communist Party (Guizhou Yearbook 1987). As two Guizhou scholars summarize 
this part of the strategy,  
In 1991, a key provincial infrastructure project was to construct, expand, deepen 
and repaved public roadways, especially emphasizing the proactive application 
of the Food-for-Work program to build mountain roads, link administrative 
villages with navigable roads, and to support the construction of township and 
village roadways. (Wang and Zhang 2003, p. 403) 
Also in the early 1990s, Guizhou further expanded this plan, by including the expansion of 
roadways linking township to counties. These plans were also explicitly tied to poverty 
reduction, as when Guizhou’s 1994 plan for poverty reduction highlighted the use of rural 
roadways as a key element of its anti-poverty plan, by constructing “local roadways for poor 
towns and townships, as well as most market places and commercial areas,” (Guizhou 
Yearbook 1991, 1995). Overall, between 1989 and 1999, Guizhou invested more than RMB 4 
billion to build 8,919 km of road linking county and township, thereby connecting for the first 
time 315 townships with their county cities (Ran and Lie 2000). Based on partial statistics, road 
density of Guizhou’s “non-graded roads” far exceeded that of Yunnan’s (Guizhou and Yunnan 
Statistical Yearbooks, various years). The density of such roads by the mid-1990s in Guizhou 
 (12.78 km/100 km2) exceeded 
Yunnan’s (7.58 km/100 km2) 
by about forty percent (Figure 
6). Moreover, while Guizhou 
claimed to have built more 
than 2000 kilometers of village-
to-market roads in the years 
between 1993 and 1996, official 
data from Yunnan indicates 
that the length of such roads 
declined between 1991 and 1996. For its well-developed highway system (which supported 
trade and tourism in the province – thus sparking increased GDP but little poverty reduction), 
however, Yunnan has a relatively underdeveloped country road system (ranking 12th in China 
for length and 16th for total density). Guizhou on the other hand ranks third in China for 
county road. Moreover, although it might seem counterintuitive, the country roads I traveled on 
in Guizhou were of much higher quality than those in Yunnan. More packed, less muddy 
during the rain, and wider, often with borders on each side, Guizhou’s country roads tended to 
be much more navigable, thus likely reducing costs and facilitating transport to market.  
Therefore, based on both statistical data and fieldwork, a key element of Guizhou’s 
development included the construction of low-level roadways, the kind that is vital for the 
village-level economy, though of limited use for economic growth in the province. The 
distribution and structure of the roadways in both provinces, and the economic effects of such 
roads, were generally consistent with our expectations. Yunnan’s main strategy in its road 
construction policy was to focus its resources on building highways, which successfully 
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Figure 6: Road density of non-rated roadway in Guizhou 
and Yunnan. (Various sources) 
 stimulated the province’s exports and supported the development of the tourism industry. 
Guizhou for its part concentrated on rural roadways, becoming in the process a leading 
province in density of such roadways.  
 
Factor 2: Migration – “Move a tree and it dies, move a man and he thrives,” (Chinese 
proverb) 
Starting in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms sparked fresh waves of migrant flows 
in China, flows that had been dammed through strict controls over population movement 
established in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. It was rural-to-urban migration 
that dominated this period, as tens millions of primarily young rural laborers brought 
inexpensive labor to cities of all sizes, further stimulating industrialization and construction in 
China’s coastal cities. Such flows reduced poverty in the countryside, both by reducing mouths 
to feed and by adding the small-but-significant remittances farmers’ family earnings in the 
countryside. Many migrant families also saved a portion of these remittances, accumulating the 
capital needed to start small businesses once the migrant, newly endowed with experience and 
new skills, returned to the countryside.13 Recent research suggests remittances benefited poor 
households. Whereas migrant income constituted about 43 percent of the incomes of the 
                                                     
13 The vast majority of migrants work diligently and spend frugally, mailing the bulk of their 
earnings to their home villages to provide for basic family needs, the education of siblings, the 
housing improvements and other necessities. Qian (1996) shows that such remittances are of a 
scale that makes a major difference in the household economy, although these effects are felt 
primarily on household income. By comparing net income of migrants with those of an average 
rural family at the origin, Ma also shows that remittances are especially beneficial in poorer 
non-coastal provinces, where the income ratio is 5:1 in favor of families with migrants (Ma 1999, 
p. 179). Taylor and his colleagues also find that remittances make a major difference in rural 
incomes, increasing them between 16-43 percent. A study of six provinces in 2000 concludes 
that the average migrant remits one-third of their total income (RMB 908), and that families 
back home receive on average RMB 465 per person, or 77 percent of their own earned wages. 
Migrant remittances as a proportion of total income are greater the poorer the family. 
 wealthiest 50 percent, it represented 62 percent of the total income of the poorest 10 percent of 
households in the sample. Among residents of China’s poor counties, controlling for resource 
endowments, households with migrants tend to have per capita incomes 12 percent higher than 
those households without migrants (Du, Park, and Wang 2004, pp. 12-6).14  
Migration also helps spur urban development and growth. Migrants contribute to the 
growth of areas to which they migrate by providing low-wage services that urban workers, 
endowed until the mid-1990s with cradle-to-grave job protection and urban residence permits 
that guaranteed them a degree of social protection, are unwilling to perform (Knight, Song, and 
Jia 1999). In contrast to its impact on urban areas, however, migration contributes only modestly 
to the income growth of the rural area of origin. Since migrants are almost exclusively the 
youngest, best-educated and most vigorous people from their village (Rozelle et al. 1999; Yang 
and Guo 1999; Hare 1999), migration often removes from the village the most productive 
workers.15 Migrant remittances, when used to start businesses, can help develop rural areas; 
however, the extent to which this occurs, especially in poor areas, depends on to what purpose 
the funds are applied.16 Overall, migration brings to urban China far more economic growth 
that it does to rural China (especially for poor areas), although poor rural areas have benefited 
through reduced poverty.  
                                                     
14 Using a different poverty line, Du and his colleagues find that poverty rates after remittances 
declined from 67.1 percent to 49.2 percent. 
15 In two villages with significant remittances that Qian surveys, migration actually reduced 
agricultural production because of the loss of labor. He concludes, “the impact of out-migration 
on local economic development in these two villages turned out to be more negative, although 
some of the remittances were invested in some small household businesses,” (Qian 1996, p. 138).  
16 A survey by Taylor and his colleagues found weak evidence that households reinvest 
remittances in “self-employed activities,” and also found that these investments rarely returned 
immediate profits (Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw 2003, p. 94). Another survey of five villages 
revealed that while remittances in four villages increased household income, in only two of 
these villages did migration spur new businesses (Qian 1996). During fieldwork, I saw few 
examples of remittance-based investment in businesses. 
 Although Guizhou and Yunnan shared many attributes throughout the 1980s that allow us 
to expect that the patterns of migration within the two provinces would be similar, the actual 
migration rates in the two provinces differed dramatically. While both provinces are similar 
regionally, geographically and demographically, Guizhou had a much higher rate of migration 
that Yunnan during the 1990s. During the mid-to-late 1980s, migration rates in both provinces 
(like those in most western provinces save Sichuan) were low, as rural residents were 
constrained – by legal restrictions, lack of information and insufficiently developed migrant 
networks – from participating extensively in migration at that time. However, starting in the 
late 1980s and increasingly in the early 1990s, Guizhou saw a surge of migration, reaching a rate 
that eventually exceeded average flows in China and in the country’s southwest, dwarfing 
Yunnan’s more modest increases. In Guizhou, this created a virtuous cycle as initial migrants 
sought opportunities for and otherwise encouraged friends and relatives to migrate, reflecting 
“chain migration” that is common throughout China (Rozelle et al. 1999).  Guizhou’s significant 
migration flows, though earlier than Yunnan’s, began later than those from other inland 
provinces such as Anhui and Sichuan. The relatively few years of experience among migrants 
from Guizhou translated to more modest salaries for migrants. While remittances were crucial 
to reducing poverty among the families of migrants, it was less often sufficient to invest in 
productive businesses. Although Guizhou’s inexpensive labor contributed to stimulating 
economic growth, because large numbers of laborers worked outside the province, migration 
contributed to the GDP of other provinces, primarily Guangdong and Jiangsu. Thus, in Guizhou, 
migration contributes to the explanation of the pattern we saw emerging in the 1990s: poverty 
reduction without economic growth. Meanwhile, Yunnan’s labor flows, whether internal or 
outside the province, were among China’s lowest. Because the majority of Yunnan’s relatively 
few rural migrants stayed within the province, their labor contributed to both economic growth 
 and poverty reduction in the province. Yunnan’s relative low rates of migration meant that 
Yunnan did not benefit from migration’s ability to reduce poverty.  
Three national sources of migration data for Guizhou and Yunnan (the 1990 and 2000 
censuses and the 1995 1% survey), as well as annual yearbooks reveal that Guizhou residents 
tended to migrate far more frequently Yunnan residents; moreover, when Guizhou residents 
migrated, they tended to quit the province entirely, whereas Yunnan-based migrants tended to 
stay within the province.17 China’s 1990 census suggests that Guizhou and Yunnan residents 
were among the least likely to migrate in China.18 Despite the similarity between the volume of 
migrants in Yunnan and Guizhou, one enduring element of the difference between the two 
provinces became evident during this period: Guizhou migrants tended to migrate out of the 
province more frequently than their Yunnan counterparts.19 The differences between Guizhou 
                                                     
17 Chinese statistical sources of migration are difficult to use. First, the data underestimate the 
incidence of migration. Many migrants, especially in the early years, moved illegally and, 
despite the improving legal infrastructure in China, still experienced social discrimination. For 
this reason, is not surprising that poor rural migrants might avoid social scientists and census 
takers, increasing the difficulty of reporting accurate estimations of the size and flow of 
migration. Second, the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 1995 1% survey calculate migration rates 
in different ways. The 1990 census reports all those who are away from where they lived long-
term five years previously (including in-province migration), whereas the 2000 census reports 
anyone living in a province other than the one in which they are registered. The 1% survey may 
be less accurate than the census in terms of its sampling. According to Du and his co-authors, 
the 2000 census is more accurate for measuring migration, because it asks not only where 
respondents currently live but also the location of their resident permits (Du, Park, and Wang 
2004, p. 7). However, the 2000 census measures only migrants who had left the province, and 
thus cannot be used as a source for intraprovincial migration. With these caveats in mind, a 
general pattern nevertheless emerges from these primary sources, as well from secondary social 
science research. 
18 Some 777,500 Guizhou residents (or about 2.4 percent of the whole population, rank 24) and 
one million Yunnan residents (about 2.7 percent, rank 19) had by then settled somewhere other 
than their hometowns, out of a total of 34 million Chinese who had by then left their 
hometowns. 
19 According to the 1990 census, of Guizhou’s 777,500 migrants, 40 percent (the 9th highest ratio 
in China) settled in other provinces. Of the more than one million migrants from Yunnan, only 
27 percent (the 19th highest ratio in China) migrated out of the province by 1990. 
 and Yunnan widened between 
1990 and 1995. According to the 
1995 1% population sample 
survey, migration from Guizhou 
slightly exceeded Yunnan’s in 
proportion to its population.20 
Overall, two-thirds more Guizhou 
rural residents left the province 
than did Yunnan residents, 
despite the fact that, in 1995, 
Yunnan’s rural population 
exceeded Guizhou’s by more than 
13 percent.21  
These trends in Guizhou and 
Yunnan continued between the 
years 1995-1998, according to 
Chinese provincial-level data 
(Figures 7 and 8). Calculating 
                                                     
20 This survey implies that about 2.7 percent of Guizhou’s total agricultural population 
(compared to 2.5 percent of Yunnan’s) had migrated by 1995. Whereas total migration rates in 
both provinces increased by 1990-1995, the proportion of Guizhou’s migrants who migrated out 
of the province grew, while Yunnan’s rate remained about the same as that in 1990. 
21 According to the survey, about half of Guizhou’s migrants departed the province to seek 
work (compared to 40 percent in 1990), while only 30 percent of Yunnan’s migrants left the 
province, basically the same proportion as in 1990. In all, about 1.3 percent of the rural 
population of Guizhou left the province by 1995, about double the proportion in Yunnan (about 
0.7 percent of the rural population of Yunnan left the province), according to this survey. 
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Figure 7: Migration rates (inside or outside the 
province). Source: China Population Yearbook, Various 
Years
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Figure 8: Migration rates (outside the province only). 
Source: China Population Yearbook, Various Years 
 migration differently than the censuses, this source found that 1.44 percent of Guizhou residents 
migrated either within or outside the province in 1995, far above the 0.16 percent of Yunnan 
residents who migrated, but still below the 2.35 percent average across China’s provinces. The 
rate of migration for each province grew steadily, with Guizhou exceeding the national average 
by 1996. By 1998, 5.7 percent of Guizhou’s residents (rank of 10 in China), were living away 
from home, compared to 1.22 percent of Yunnan’s rural residents (rank of 24) and 4.37 percent 
China’s provinces as a whole. Moreover, while the majority (80 percent) of Guizhou migrants 
left the province, a minority of Yunnan migrants (around 30 percent) moved to other provinces. 
This pattern is also consistent with data from the 2000 census, which indicates that the rate of 
Guizhou’s migration outside the province continued to accelerate. By 2000, 1.6 million people 
with Guizhou residence permits lived long-term outside the province (4.9 percent of the 
population – rank of 9),22 nearly five times the number of people who had left the province a 
decade previously (312,800). Compared to this, the 343,542 Yunnan residence permit holders 
(0.9 percent of the population, ranking 26) living outside the province seems modest. 
Other provincial-level studies using different methods consistently suggest that Guizhou’s 
rural residents migrated more than Yunnan’s. Johnson estimates migration within provinces 
from 1990 to 2000 by calculating the differences between expected and reported populations. In 
this way, he finds that whereas 2.27 million people left Guizhou (7 percent of the population) 
during that decade, Yunnan experienced a net gain of 730,000 people (adding two percent to its 
population) over the same period (Johnson 2002, p. 24).23 These statistical data are also 
                                                     
22 Compare this figure with the 3.42 percent average for China as a whole and five percent 
average for Southwest China (Du, Park, and Wang 2004, Table 4). 
23 A survey of six provinces, although it does not include Guizhou, does support the conclusion 
that Yunnan’s migrants are few relative to the rest of the country, increasing from an estimated 
zero percent in 1988 to four percent in 1995, compared to national totals of five percent and 12 
 consistent with results from fieldwork. In many Guizhou villages, spread throughout the 
province, whether minority areas or not, it was less common to see young people between the 
ages of 16-35. Interviews with households in such villages revealed that many of these migrants 
had left the province, mainly to the coastal province of Guangdong to work in factories or on 
construction sites. Most of the families had received remittances from migrants, though in many 
cases these remittances were not large – typically a few hundred yuan per month. Interviews 
with Guizhou migrants who had returned for festivals reinforced the conclusion that Guizhou 
people migrate less than those from Sichuan, but more than those from Yunnan. For instance, 
migrants I interviewed, whether working in Sichuan, Guangzhou or other provinces, almost 
invariably reported that Sichuan migrants are very common, far more common than Guizhou 
natives; however, they almost never met migrants from Yunnan.  
In terms of distribution, the scant quantitative data available suggest that migrants from 
Guizhou hailed from the poorest areas. For instance, a survey of rural residents (Du, Park, and 
Wang 2004) in each of China’s poor counties revealed that, compared to Yunnan, Guizhou had 
a higher proportion of rural households with at least one migrant laborer. This survey indicates 
that about one in five of China’s households living in poor counties on average contain at least 
one migrant, and remittance income from those migrants likely supports these households.24  
Much more evidence is available for the impact of remittances for Guizhou’s poor areas. 
Data collected by the provincial labor employment office count only the funds that were mailed 
back home from outside the province, and do not include money that is brought back during 
                                                                                                                                                                           
percent, according to this survey (Rozelle et al. 1999, p. 372). 
24 The 1990 census figures have migration statistics from each of the two province’s poor areas. 
The rate is almost identical: 41 percent of Yunnan’s migrants came from poor counties, 
compared to 40 percent for Guizhou. By the 2000 census, Yunnan’s rate had declined to 36 
percent. Unfortunately, the county-level 2000 census data for Guizhou is unavailable. 
 holidays or money that is mailed from within the province. However, these statistics make clear 
that remittances were collectively large and important, increasing in size starting in the early 
1990s. The volume of remittances grew 460 percent between 1991, when migrants remitted RMB 
580 million, and 1996, when remittances totaled RMB 3.25 billion. To put it into scale, the more 
than RMB 3 billion in calculated remittances is sizeable compared to RMB 8.5 billion in total 
budget expenditure for the province. (I found no comparable data for Yunnan.) Moreover, these 
remittances make a major difference to the local economy. For instance, statistics collected by 
Guizhou’s provincial labor employment office conclude that remittances sent back by migrant 
laborers exceeded the entire government revenues of 22 of Guizhou’s 87 counties and in some 
cases more than three times as large (Wang and Zhang 2003, p. 548). 
Thus, migration contributes to the overall pattern seen in Yunnan and Guizhou. For 
Guizhou, it helped reduce poverty, even as modest remittances contributed little to that 
province’s economic growth. Guizhou’s mobile labor force primarily contributed primarily to 
other provinces’ GDP growth. For Yunnan, the effect of migration is one of a missed 
opportunity – since few rural residents have migrated, migration does not explain economic 
growth (except that most migrants worked within the province), although it does explain the 
lack of poverty reduction. Moreover, Yunnan appears to be trapped in a vicious cycle – because 
few migrated, there is little basis for chain migration today.  
 
Factor 3: Coal Mining – Coal is the food of industry (Vladimir Lenin) 
Coal mining is often positioned to help directly reduce rural poverty. Although 
extraordinarily dangerous, coal mining is a relatively low-skilled activity in which most able-
bodied poor people can participate. The scale of mines however is crucial. Larger scale mines, 
usually featuring relatively advanced equipment and capital-intensive techniques, can have a 
 major impact on economic growth, while smaller-scale mines, more labor-intensive and often 
employing cruder technology and tools, can make a greater difference in reducing poverty. 
Throughout the world, larger scale mining extracts 95 percent of the world’s total mineral 
production with but 2.5 million people, while smaller-scale mining, employs an estimated 13 
million workers and directly or indirectly supports an estimated 80-100 million people (Weber-
Fahr et al. 2002).  
In China’s case, though rarely profitable, the coal industry has undergirded the economic 
growth in this country which relies on coal for more than two-thirds its energy and 80 percent 
of its electricity (Rui 2004, p. 3). China categorizes its mines into three types (in order of scale): 
a) centrally-controlled state-owned mines, b) locally-managed state-owned enterprises (SOE) on 
the provincial, prefecture and county levels, and c) local non-state-owned mines under 
township, village, collective or individual authority called town-and-village enterprise (TVE) 
mines. Micro-scale mines – a fourth, ‘unofficial’ category – are mined, often illegally, by groups 
of individuals, often on an ad hoc and seasonal basis. Since all mines use primarily rural labor, 
the central government further hoped that development of small-scale, non-state local mines 
would also reduce poverty and improve the welfare of local rural residents – an explicit policy 
goal. Though highly dangerous, in many cases poverty compels many to turn to coal mining for 
a crucial source of income.25 Recent central efforts to shut these mines are likely to exacerbate 
rural poverty. 
                                                     
25 Despite their contribution to poverty reduction and economic growth, China’s mines “are the 
most dangerous in the world,” according to a recent study aptly subtitled "Your Rice Bowl or 
Your Life?" (Wright 2004, p. 631). Statistics (likely understated) concerning accident rates in 
China’s mines suggested that state-owned mines were responsible for more than twice as many 
deaths per million tons than India between 1992 and 2001, and nearly 30 times as many as in 
United States’ coal industry over nearly the same period. While each death means a lost 
breadwinner, often contributing to the numbers of poor, these losses probably do not outweigh 
 Coal mining is one of the few industries in which Guizhou enjoys a clear advantage over 
Yunnan. In the reform era, Guizhou’s production capacity has consistently exceeded Yunnan’s 
and in most periods also grew faster. Overall, between 1978 and 1996 (before changes in central 
policy forced production cuts in both provinces), Guizhou’s production more than quadrupled 
(increasing 335 percent) compared to Yunnan’s growth over that period of 158 percent. 
Focusing on the early 1990s, 
Guizhou’s production capacity 
increased 65 percent, from 
37.23 million tons in 1991 to 
61.54 million tons in 1996, 
while during that same period 
Yunnan’s production increased 
by a healthy, but more modest, 
40 percent, from about 22 
million tons in 1991 to 30.7 
million tons in 1996. Expressed 
in per capita terms, the gap 
between Guizhou’s coal 
production capacity and 
Yunnan’s is even starker (Figure 9), with the gap increasing especially rapidly between 1991 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the economic benefits, especially in terms of poverty reduction. For instance, applying death 
rates reported by Wright, Guizhou would have lost approximately 125 miners based on its 
production in 1991, and 252 miners based on 1996 production levels. This morbid calculation 
has to be weighed against the number of families that depend on mining for income, including 
the reported 300,000 workers formally employed in the mining industry in Guizhou in 1993 
(Guizhou Statistical Yearbook 1994, p. 54). 
Coal Production Per Capita 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
To
ns
 o
f c
oa
l p
er
 1
,0
00
 p
eo
pl
e
Yunnan Guizhou
Figure 9: Coal production per capita in 
Yunnan and Guizhou. Guizhou and Yunnan 
Yearbooks, various years. 
 and 1996. Guizhou’s productive capacity 
per capita was double that of Yunnan’s 
between 1993 and 1998.26  
Not only is Guizhou’s coal industry 
larger than Yunnan’s, but its distribution 
favors poor areas.27 In 1996, 56 percent of 
Guizhou’s total coal production was 
produced in poor counties, compared to 39 
percent for Yunnan (Figure 10), while coal 
production in Guizhou’s poor counties was 
triple that of Yunnan’s poor counties. 
Although losses in the industry in the wake 
of changes in central government policy 
after 1998 dramatically reduced the 
production of both provinces, the losses in 
both provinces were evenly spread between 
poor and non-poor counties, leaving the 
                                                     
26 Central policy changes in the late 1990s also affected Guizhou’s industry more, especially 
initially. After 1998, while Guizhou’s production declined 39 percent from 65.6 million tons to 
30.3 million tons the next year, coal production in Yunnan declined 13 percent from 30.9 million 
tons in 1998 to 26.6 million tons over that period. Nevertheless, Guizhou’s coal industry was 
consistently larger than Yunnan’s, and apparently recovered from cutbacks in the late 1990s, as 
production nearly tripled between 2001 and 2004. 
27 Yunnan’s production by poor counties improved somewhat by 1996, compared to 1991, when 
poor counties produced about one-third of all of the province’s coal (33.1 percent). Information 
about Guizhou’s county-level coal production in 1991 is not available.  
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 proportions the same as 
previous year.28 Despite losses in 
production, Guizhou’s poor 
counties still produced more 
than twice as much as Yunnan’s 
poor counties (Figure 11).   
The structure of coal mines 
in Guizhou is also more 
conducive to poverty reduction 
compared to those in Yunnan.29 
In the early 1990s, one-third of 
Guizhou’s coal was produced in 
SOE mines, while the remaining 
two-thirds of Guizhou’s coal 
production came from small-
scale (often tiny) TVEs. Although 
TVEs produced a majority of 
Yunnan’s coal, throughout the 1990s a higher proportion of coal mines were organized into 
medium-sized or larger enterprises with some degree of sophisticated technology and 
equipment. As Figure 12 indicates, the proportion of coal produced by Guizhou’s TVE mines is 
consistently higher than Yunnan’s and, starting in 1991, increased faster. By 1996, TVEs 
                                                     
28 In Yunnan, coal production in poor counties increased to 41 percent, while in Guizhou it 
increased to 58 percent. 
29 Unfortunately, available statistics do not allow us to analyze simultaneously distribution 
(poor versus non poor counties) and structure (SOE mines vs. TVE mines).  
Figure 12: Percentage of coal production by TVE mines.
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Figure 13: Ownership structure of mines. 
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 produced about two-thirds of Yunnan’s coal output, while Guizhou’s TVEs produced four-
fifths. Moreover, as shown in Figure 13, annual coal production in Guizhou’s TVEs captured 
most of the gains in coal production, doubling in capacity between 1990 and 1996. This growth 
outpaced not only that of Guizhou’s SOEs (annual production of which dropped by 272,000 
tons), but also that of Yunnan’s TVEs (annual production increased by more than 750,000 tons) 
and Yunnan’s SOEs (annual production increased by 930,000 tons). Therefore, while TVEs 
captured all of the gains in Guizhou’s coal production, over this period, the relatively slower 
growth in Yunnan’s coal production was shared between TVEs and SOEs. 
Fieldwork reinforced the conclusions of the scholarly literature that coal mines of different 
sorts will help either reducing poverty or promote economic growth, depending on how they 
are structured. In both Yunnan and Guizhou, I saw numerous coal mines of all sorts, primarily 
located in poor areas. In studying coal mines and by talking to local residents near the mines 
and workers who worked there, I reached two broad conclusions that reinforced the impression 
that the coal industry helped to explain the puzzle. First, there was a distinction in most areas to 
which I traveled between coal mines in Yunnan and coal mines in Guizhou, even among TVEs. 
Yunnan’s TVE mines tended on the whole to be larger in scale, with broader boundaries, and 
larger, more formal management. In Guizhou, TVE mines tended to be less formally organized, 
with smaller teams organized in an ad hoc fashion under a local leader. While in the case of 
Yunnan, workers tended to be equipped with relatively more advanced equipment, Guizhou 
miners generally relied on pickaxes and other simple hand tools. In Guizhou, I would pass by 
tiny scale mines, some just on the side of the road. During my fieldwork, I would also encounter 
people carrying coal in baskets on their back or in vehicles to the market to sell directly to 
households for food or home heating. Second, I also noticed that TVEs mines in Guizhou were 
often located near – sometimes directly adjacent to – other small-scale TVEs, such as brick kilns 
 or other industries, usually related to construction. In this way, the coal mines provided a 
steady supply of fuel for these other industries, which in turn would supply a steady market for 
the coal. These ancillary industries, moreover, would provide additional employment 
opportunities for nearby rural residents to work. I saw fewer such enterprises in Yunnan, where 
the coal tended to be sold to larger processing centers, which would transport it to urban 
centers, or export it to other provinces. 
While much of the differences in volume, distribution and structure between Yunnan and 
Guizhou’s coal industries are based on the natural attributes of each province’s coal 
endowments, the strategy each province adopted to exploit those natural endowments 
nevertheless shaped the development of the coal industry in disparate ways. Guizhou’s coal 
mining industry, especially production from TVEs, was an important part of the province’s 
anti-poverty policies beginning in the mid-1980s. Guizhou’s March 1986 anti-poverty directive 
made production of coal and other natural resources an integral part of provincial development 
policy, and also made coal mines within poor counties tax-free. The province’s 1990 policy 
similarly emphasized the development of pillar industries, including coal mining, and 
especially, TVEs. In Yunnan, during the mid-1990s, just as China’s central government re-
emphasized the goal of reducing and eliminating subsidies for the coal industry, Yunnan 
redoubled its commitment to subsidizing its SOEs. Against the tide of reform and reduced 
dependency of industry on government subsidies, Yunnan adopted on October 31, 1995 a policy 
toward SOEs in the coal sector of “two adds” (adding investment, while increasing the speed of 
development) and “two unchangables” (continuing “the level of support,” and “subsidizing 
losses”). Yunnan was also much more restrictive in terms of licensing TVEs, compared to 
Guizhou, which encouraged small informal groups of miners to exploit coal resources. Thus, 
although the structure of coal is related to geography, government policy here too had an 
 impact on the eventual effect resources 
had on poverty and growth in these 
provinces. Moreover, despite its lower 
coal production, Yunnan consumed 
both a greater amount of coal overall, as 
well as a greater proportion of its own 
coal resources compared to Guizhou, 
which was forced by central policy to 
send, at prices far below market, its 
natural resources to rapidly growing 
coastal provinces (Figures 14 and 15).   
Thus, despite coal’s contribution to 
Yunnan’s economic growth, due to its 
volume, distribution and structure, 
Yunnan’s coal industry did not reduce 
poverty to the extent that might 
otherwise be expected. In Guizhou, by 
contrast, coal production likely impeded 
economic development, though it did 
reduce poverty, primarily through 
smaller-scale TVEs based in Guizhou’s poor counties. The effect on poverty reduction must be 
weighed against the substantial risks endemic in coal mining.  
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Figure 14: Coal consumption in Yunnan and 
Guizhou. Source: Yunnan and Guizhou 
Statistical Yearbooks, Various Years. 
Figure 15: The Relationship between 
consumption and production of coal in Yunnan 
and Guizhou. Source: Yunnan and Guizhou 
Statistical Yearbooks, Various Years 
  
Section Four: Conclusion  
This research revealed that the different patterns of economic growth and poverty 
reduction in the two provinces can be partially explained through their disparate approaches to 
similar factors including roads, migration and coal mining (and tourism – not discussed here). 
While these elements proved to be important in both cases, it is the variation within each of 
them that explains the differing patterns of economic growth and poverty reduction in Yunnan 
and Guizhou. Moreover, these factors were shaped by policy strategy adopted by these 
provincial governments, not just by geographic or economic factors. 
This is not a traditional ‘state-vs.-market’ argument, since the results of this research suggest 
that it is the particular role the state plays and the strategy it adopts that is important. For 
instance, regarding roadway, both provinces established policies and plans at the same time, 
but they did so in contrasting ways. Yunnan’s strategy promoted large-scale construction 
intended to maximize economic growth largely through industrial growth. Guizhou’s strategy, 
on the other hand, focused on small-scale activities and poverty reduction. A similar story can 
be found with migration. Guizhou’s strategy toward its surplus labor force incorporated 
attempts to export its labor to Guizhou’s urban, mining and industrial centers, as well as 
outside the province, especially to coastal cities. Guizhou’s 1986 “Directives on Strengthening 
Work in Poor Areas,” the province’s first formal anti-poverty policy of the reform era suggested 
that some central and provincial policies had to be relaxed to deal with poverty, among them 
policies proscribing population movements. The migration spurred by government initiatives 
multiplied, as the dynamics of chain migration took effect. By contrast, any effort to spur 
migration remains absent from any of Yunnan’s anti-poverty policies. Yunnan’s rapidly 
increasing growth attracted relatively few native migrants, but did encourage many from other 
 provinces to migrate to Yunnan (Liang and White 1997; Zhu and Poncet 2003). Both provinces 
restructured the coal industry. A larger proportion of Yunnan’s more modest production of coal 
employed wealthier workers and fueled the province’s growth.  A greater portion of Guizhou’s 
larger production – which employed greater numbers of poor people – was exported to the 
rapidly-growing coast.  
Yunnan overall appears to be close to emulating the strategy of a developmental state, by 
focusing planning and investment in selected industries (such as tourism, coal mining and 
tobacco), and sourcing the resources and infrastructure needed to support it. As with typical 
developmental states, Yunnan’s primary goal is increasing economic growth, obtained in part 
by attempting to shift labor, profits and other resources out of agriculture and into industry, 
and to achieve economies of scale large enough to increase significantly productivity growth.30 
However, by focusing its resources on a limited area (primarily the overall development of 
central areas, of tourism in the south and parts of the northwest, tobacco in the southwest and 
coal mining in various areas) and a limited range of industrial sectors, supported in part by the 
construction of an extensive highway system, Yunnan concentrated its resources. Moreover, 
many of the decisions made by Yunnan’s provincial government, such as focusing the 
development of its tourism industry in specific areas, and attempting to develop larger-scale 
coal-based TVEs, effectively nurtured the growth of those sectors and the economy as a whole. 
However, in doing so, Yunnan’s decisions excluded large poor regions, primarily in the 
province’s southeast, northeast and most of its west, and structured industries in ways that 
made participation by poor people difficult.  
                                                     
30 Other evidence that suggest Yunnan is a developmental state includes a notable urban bias, 
heavy taxation of agriculture (even by China standards) and extensive government expenditure 
and investment. A lack of space precludes further discussion of these. 
 Guizhou, focused as it has been on small-scale industries (exemplified here by coal mining, 
but also including tourism), suggests an alternative model towards poverty reduction, which I 
dub the ‘micro-oriented state.’ This model is characterized by adoption of a primary goal of 
rural poverty reduction through improving rural livelihoods, achieved not only by shifting 
rural labor (through out-of-province migration) but also by increasing opportunities for farmers 
to increase their incomes at home, by augmenting access to local markets and by promoting 
local tourism. The micro-oriented state in this way augments opportunities for poor rural 
people by supporting activities that poor people can access, such as those that require little 
formal education and experience in using technology. In doing so, it rejects the dominant 
strategies of development and poverty reduction that emphasize development based on large-
scale, high-tech industry.31  
Despite providing an alternative pathway to poverty reduction, Guizhou’s record should be 
considered cautiously. The province has experienced significant poverty reduction, impressive 
compared to endemic poverty throughout the world (despite robust global growth), especially 
considering the significant barriers the province faced and its modest economic growth rate. 
Nevertheless, the province has been and remains poor, with severe poverty persisting in many 
regions. Because the province’s economy is underdeveloped, and remains among the lowest as 
measured by per capita GDP, it is not surprising that skepticism greets the claim that Guizhou 
has anything to offer as a model for poverty reduction. Most people living in Yunnan’s cities 
                                                     
31 As Schumacher argued in a popular book published nearly three decades ago, “Today, we 
suffer from an almost universal idolatry of gigantism. It is therefore necessary to insist on the 
virtues of smallness – where this applies,” (Schumacher 1973, p. 62.)  This is equally true today, 
when the main thrust of many anti-poverty models from all points of the ideological spectrum 
that emphasize larger scale industries. 
 have a higher standard of living compared to Guizhou’s, and residents of Yunnan’s tobacco and 
tourism regions live relatively comfortably.  
Nevertheless, life in Yunnan’s impoverished areas is often much harsher than in equivalent 
areas of Guizhou. Moreover, compared to its economic growth rate, Guizhou’s achievements in 
increasing income of poor people to a sufficient degree to pull millions of rural residents out of 
poverty is laudable. This is no minor feat, considering that most models fail to reduce povery, a 
sobering fact faced by those attempting to reduce poverty of all types – rural or urban, in 
developing or developed countries. Moreover, the growth performance of Yunnan has slowed, 
whereas Guizhou’s has increased, perhaps (a cautious ‘perhaps’ since I have yet to investigate 
this) bolstering arguments that growth is best achieved bottom-up (by first addressing poverty), 
compared to hoping that growth will trickle down to the poor (Moon and Dixon 1992).  
The model the province used, that of encouraging indirect economic opportunities 
accessible to poor people to supplement income from agriculture, I argue should be considered 
as one of the alternative mechanisms for poverty reduction. The importance of discovering 
additional models should not be doubted, given the 1.2 billion people that today remain in 
poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2004).  The case of Guizhou suggests (and more research is needed 
to confirm generalizability of this) that in contrast to approaches that emphasize capital-
intensive, large-scale development of the type that spurs economic growth, it is the smaller scale 
approaches, of a kind that are distributed and structured to be accessible to poor people, that 
can better provide the opportunities needed to reduce rural poverty. 
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